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ON BEING HUMAN: MOLTMANN1S 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF HOPE 
G. CLARKE CHAPMAN 
Over the years Moltmann' s vision of human selfhood has unfolded in the context 
of his overall theology. Accordingly there are shifts of emphasis, depending upon the 
decade of his work. It seems best to summarize his thought on the two sides of a 
watershed which occurred, he states, in the late 1 970s. This was the time in which he 
began sketching his Systematic Contributions series and in which he experienced a "the-
ological turning point"' resulting from a 1978 conference in Mexico City with libera-
tion theologians. That date may serve as a rough marker for accentuating a shift 
already underway, a relaxing of his earlier political theology utilizing some Marxist 
categories and instead a new celebration of trinitarian thought. The same shift is also 
discemable in his emerging doctrine of what it means to be human. 
The writings of the early Moltmann, that is, those prior to 1 978, reflect the exhila-
ration and intellectual context of his ground-breaking Theology of Hope. At that time 
his views of humankind and society were affected by many influences, including 
dialectical theology, the biblical theology of von Rad and Kasemann, the "warm 
stream" of revisionist Marxism (especially Ernst Bloch), the 1960s Christian-Marxist 
dialogues, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School of ideology critique. Looking 
back on this period, he wrote, "l myself came from the Critical Theory to the justice-
and-theoclicy question as common for theology and socialist philosophy and from 
there to the burning Auschwitz-question."' The latent [ewish messianism of Bloch and 
other Euro-Marxists increasingly attracted him to other [ewish writers (e.g., Franz 
Rosenzweig) and to Christian-[ewish dialogues. Interest in these and other inter-group 
dialogues during these exciting years no doubt helped to prompt an early focus on 
theological anthropology.' Hope must set the context, he insists, for the irreducible 
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ambiguity of human selfhood. For this theme of ambiguity he is partly indebted to a num-
ber of European philosophical anthropologists, such as Helmut Plessner and Arnold 
Gehlen. For instance he often cites Plessner, who described humanity as the "ex "entric" 
being, an ellipse with two foci, a self-transcendence that both has and is a body.' 
Theological anthropology may begin by asking how humans come to a knowledge of 
themselves. Here Moltrnann manifests the influence of Calvin and Barth: there is a recip-
rocal relationship between the knowledge of humankind and the knowledge of God. To 
themselves, humans are an incessant question-mark, but in God we see "the worth 
(Wiirde) of the question-able (frag-wiirdig) being which we all are." 5 Moses at the burning 
bush asked "Who am I. .. ?" and received no direct reply at all, but instead the promise "I 
will be with you" (Exod. 3: I 1-12) and ultimately the self-giving of Immanuel, "God with 
us."' From here, and continuing through the coming of the Son of Man, we see the Bible 
has no set anthropology, and ascribes no fixed attributes or prerogatives to human 
beings as such, but instead speaks of men and women only in the restless, unfolding his-
tory of their relationship to God.' 
As a historical and thereby unfinished being, the human being is really not definable at 
all. "The essence of mankind is hidden and has not yet appeared. 'Mankind' -the realized 
generic concept-is becoming, is still in process, has not yet acquired a fixed 'nature'."8 It is 
not simply that God is hidden (Deus absconditus), but that God is the key to humanity's 
own self-mystery (Homo absconditus).' The Old Testament prohibition of images implies a 
warning against attempts to anticipate a clarity that can be possible only at the eschaton; 
to venture definitions of humanity's essence here and now would only betray persons 
into fixated norms and manipulation. 10 The history of Marxism, for instance, would be an 
illustration of the dangers entailed by a unifonn model of "true humanity'' which is then 
imposed upon hapless individuals and societies. 
Far easier to define, however, is our present inhumanity! "What true humanity is 
can be comprehended in a positive affirmation only with extreme difficulty. On the 
other hand, what inhumanity is-from Nero to Hitler and from the hell of Auschwitz 
to the hells of our own day-can be designated with moderate precision from our 
experience."" Here is a clear example of Moltmann's fondness for a category bor-
rowed from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, the negation of the negative. 
Here it means that what we humans hold in common is not our positive attributes, 
our alleged virtue or capacities. Rather, the Gospel addresses us solely on the presup-
position of our common inhumanity-whether Jew or Greek, slave or free. 
"Throughout all periods of history there is a solidarity of afflicted men in their com-
mon lack of freedom and glory ... the partnership of deprivation," which can also be 
called the "history of the world's suffering."" 
This universal inhumanity is the reason why, since his The Crudfied God, Moltmann has 
insisted that the knowledge of God is bound to the cross. We are a fallen race, no longer 
Mensch ("human being") but Unmensch ("Inhuman being"), unable to know God directly, 
naturally. Instead, we persistently misuse the available knowledge of God for our own self-
deification. So any theologies of glory must be countered, as Luther said, by a "theology of 
the cross." Only the cross takes seriously the "Inhuman being's" perverted interest and mis-
use of the knowledge of God. The cross not only disclosed God in the unexpected fonn of 
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despised and brutalized humanity, but it continues to be a crucifying knowledge-one that 
smashes all the means of human self-exaltation, and liberates the homo incurvatus in se into a 
new openness to God and neighbor. It is in this seeming contradiction, God in the broken 
form of the crucified Jesus, that there is the opened possibility for us inhuman beings again 
to become truly human, beside God. 
From the beginning, Moltmann has emphasized that so-called "human nature" must 
be posited within the wider vista of an unfolding historical process. He thereby 
renounced the traditional individualism of all forms of "substance" or existentialist 
thinking. 'The world is not yet finished, but is understood as engaged in a history. It is 
therefore the world of possibilities, ... an age which stands within the horizon of a new 
future." 11 We too are unfinished women and men, poised to become what we are. Our 
restless self-questioning is not derived from some innate human property, an inherent 
cor inquietum or an immanental "openness to the world" within us, but instead arises 
from the charge and commission of God, the promissio inquieta, the eschatological 
"openness to the world ahead of us" which then beckons and disturbs the human con-
sciousness." Quoting Ortega y Gasset, "Man has no nature; he has only history," 
Moltmann goes on to add, "'Human nature,' or that which makes men men, is not 
given at the beginning of their history and does not exist as idea behind the multiplicity 
of man's appearances. If it exists at all, it stands at the goal and end of history and its 
conflicts." 15 Humans are unfinished, non-established creatures, living in an "ex-centric" 
position. As Bloch and Plessner pointed out, we are simultaneously within history and 
yet above it, like swimmers whose heads strain to rise from the water to take our bear-
ings. Hope, therefore, provides the orientation needed. Any attempt to define "the 
human" must be done through hope. 
Man, who is encountered by God's revelation in promise, is identified and finds 
himself; at the same time, however, he is differentiated and goes searching for his 
true life which is concealed in Christ (Col. 3:3). He finds himself, but only in hope, 
for he is not yet excluded from death, he is not yet risen ... He comes into harmo-
ny with himself-in spe but not in re." 
"He is still future to 'himself and is promised to himself. His future depends utterly and 
entirely on the outcome of the risen Lord's course."" Believers can only confess that they 
are riddles to themselves, examples of a homo absconditus, standing "ahead" of themselves 
in hope. Indeed, history itself is propelled by the disharmony between hope and experi-
ence. So believers risk their present provisional identity by sacrifice, expending themselves 
for the new possibilities opened up ahead. But they venture this risk, even change the 
world, because of their memory of the resurrection of the Crucified and Rejected One, 
who represents "the 'impossible possibility' of hope in this world."" 
Consequently, for Moltmann's early writings, all the strands of human characteristics 
are drawn to a Christological focus. This is especially so since The Oudfted God The cross 
confi-onts our happy idolatries, and the resurrection sets in motion our potential transfor-
mation. Jesus is described as the Son of Man (the early Moltmann' s favorite Christological 
title), the truly human person set amidst our inhumanity. 
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The crucified Lord embodies the new humanity which responds to Cod in the cir-
cumstances of inhumanity which oppose God. He incorporates home in the cir-
cumstances of alienation, and freedom in the midst of the chains of slavery. But it is 
just through this that men are empowered to alter these relationships, to make the 
world more homelike, and to abolish internal and external slavery." 
Here the vision in Daniel 7 is recalled, in which the Son of Man figure represents and is 
the vanguard of our vocation to rule the world in a humane manner, in contrast to the 
"bestial" empires of oppression. Arriving from heaven rather than emerging from the sea, 
the Son of Man enters history as somethif"ll truly new. And surrounding himself with the 
guilty, the exiles, the sick, and lowly, "the Son of Man is he who identifies with those who 
are below the mean of humanness, in order to call them human."20 
Here then is disclosed the key to the human self. It is the resurrection power of the 
exalted Son of Man that replaces what most anthropologies seek to uncover as the quin-
tessence, the basic continuity for human nature. Only the faithfulness of God constitutes, 
ever anew, what we term human identity. A person's '"essence,' and that means his iden-
tity and continuity, is determined by the call of God, by his being called to a partnership 
in the covenant, by the event of justification."" Because of this creative faithfulness of 
Cod, a human being cannot be analyzed into a mere conglomerate of reactions and func-
tions, but he/she takes courage and is held open and receptive amidst the flowing relativi-
ties of history. "In the hidden faithfulness of the Spirit, man is directed ahead of himself; 
he acquires future-not an automatic future but rather a historical future .... He acquires 
continuity in the midst of changing conditions in as far as he acquires future." 22 Put differ-
ently, although one's humanness (hominitas! be a gifr which is already a fact, one's humani-
ty (humonitas) remains a task laid before each of us." Such is humankind's continuity, both 
present and future, which is received from God. 
But what contents may we readers assign to this humanitas, this vision which is to be 
attained? The picture is unclear because, over the years, Moltmann consistently has mis-
trusted definitions, the verbal act of "setting limits." "Definitions are acts of domination,"" 
he insists, which prejudge and fossilize what is new, vital, and spontaneous. Such objectifi-
cation he considers philosophically a lapse into essentialism, and politically an invitation to 
despotism. While pedants and tyrants make use of definitions to restrict what is permitted, 
by contrast God's new creation-struggling even now to be born-will participate in God's 
limitless glory. In principle, therefore, Moltmann scorns traditional logic and empirical pre-
cision. So he resists venturing any detailed portrait of the new humanity. Nevertheless, 
readers may discern some elements of his vision of humanitas. 
One of these components reflects goals familiar since the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment: material abundance, human dignity, self-determination, and purposeful-
ness in life.25 Another ingredient is the biblical hope for universalism, a unity that sur-
mounts all economic, social, or racial distinctions." Such unity, although necessarily pre-
ceded by the apparent partisanship of God who sides with the oppressed in struggling for 
justice, is prefigured by a love of enemies. That love already begins to burst asunder our 
factional rigidities (e.g., Martin Luther King Jr.). Even now, the church, by its compassion-
ate gathering together of the diverse and the unlike (rather than the "birds of a feather'' 
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typical of other organizations), must become the Church of the "Others," acting as the 
representative and messianic vanguard of this new humanity." 
A final component of the future vision is humanity's glorification to become "like God," 
and "participate in God's infinite creativity."28 What such glorification may mean, of course, is 
eschatologically undefinable (see 1 John 3 :2). But it will not be some apotheosis that dis-
solves human creaturehood into the Godhead, or mimics Marxism's "total man." On the 
other hand we can say something about the future: it will include a gathering of individuals 
by the general resurrection, a transformation that goes beyond mere restoration of primal 
creaturehood, and both a freedom from death and a freedom for participation in God's 
infinity." In Moltmann's later writings, as we shall see, he develops such suggestions further. 
Moltmann' s analysis of sin derives from this grand hope; indeed, until we catch this 
vision we are unable even to recognize fully our fallen condition. His references to sin are 
scattered among the early writings; however, in every case sin is linked to hopelessness. 
Although derived from anxiety, hopelessness emerges in one of two overt forms: either 
praesumptio, pride, which might be called "the premature, self-willed anticipation of the 
fulfillment of what we hope for from God," or desperatio, despair and inertia, "the prema-
ture, arbitrary anticipation of the non-fulfillment of what we hope for from God."'° The 
contrast could be symbolized by the figures of Prometheus (especially popular in the 
teenth century) and Sisyphus (more typical of twentieth-century ennuil. 
Praesumptio is expressed in several ways. An obvious manifestation is the self-deification 
of humans (Vergottung) that corresponds often with the modern "un-deification" 
<Entgotterung) of heaven-as pursued by secular idealism or by the moral earnestness of 
protest-atheism." Many current ideologies have this effect, from Marxism's "total man" to 
romantic conservatism's nostalgia for organic communities, from the liberal's individualistic 
idealism to the militant' s praise of brute force and exertion of will. 32 By demanding a level 
of performance impossible to attain, however, they all result in the grim joylessness so typi-
cal of modern times. Another manifestation is the "works-righteousness" of the Western 
work ethic. Here Moltrnann has been particularly critical of Marxism which, despite its 
reproach of the West as a society of "having" instead of "being," ended up with a more 
extreme form of that same malady." Framed differently, Moltmann also describes prae-
sumptio as idolatry, a perversion of our vocation of God's image. That is, the inhuman being 
inverts the dialectic of trust and control. In trusting things or his own works, although 
they are not trustworthy but only controllable, he mistrusts God whom he cannot 
control but only trust .... The creation which he is to use and rule becomes the object 
of his trust God becomes the object of his mistrust and his exercise of control." 
The second major category of hopelessness is desperatio, a resignation, timidity, and 
weariness that prompt humans to forsake in a more passive manner what God expects of 
us. Apathy is the result; it is a pervasive sickness of our era, the fear of the pain and risk 
which love necessarily entails. In vain women and men try to flee what is actually an 
ducible dialectic of human existence: "we live (/eben) because and in so far as we love 
(/ieben)-and we suffer Oeiden) and die because and in so far as we love. In this way we 
experience life and death in love."" The price of shrinking from this sensitivity, however, 
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is to lose the ability to love, to fall prey to a range of psychosomatic illnesses, and to expe-
rience in fact a preliminary form of spiritual death. Hope, then, is the remedy for both 
pride and resignation. 
Leaving the topic of sin, let us return to the theme of the inevitable ambiguities of our 
earthly human selfhood. We have noted that the human being is a being in historical 
process, the presently fallen Unmensch who is on the way to becoming Mensch, who strug-
gles to tum the gift of lwminitas into the promised humanitas. But Moltmann early posed an 
additional polarity, one which is less temporal: we are both creature and image of God. 
First, the human is a creation of God, one among the many other fellow-creatures. 
Like them we were called into existence out of nothing and chaos, and like them we face 
annihilation again.1" This solidarity with the contingent natural world has a critical func-
tion, for it shows that neither humans nor nature are divine, nor should either be demo-
nized as evil. Of course, important ecological consequences must follow from an aware-
ness of solidarity with our fellow creatures <Mitgeschopfe). And on the personal level, it can 
begin to reverse the problem of alienation from the physical body-a problem to which 
the later Moltmann will return. For in ¥/estem society categories of "possessing" have 
become so dominant that we both despoil the natural world around us and speak of 
"having" a body instead of "being" a body.F Hope, however, should bring us mortals a 
sense of oneness with all that has been created. 
The other side, however, of humanity's eccentric position in creation is our specified 
placement and calling as the image of God. That which differentiates us from other crea-
tures is not some ur a.ltribute, but our total personhood. It is precisely in our 
web of relationships that we have the vocation to represent God in and for God's creation. 
That commission also has its critical function, for it must refute the ancient mystique of all 
nature as potential imagery for God. Such a mediary function, as early Israel insisted, belongs 
only to human beings-and furthermore, that function is not restricted to royalty, but resides 
(democratically') in humanity as such. So every human being is God's viceroy, representative 
in and to the world, and also humans must develop a far more responsible use of power 
over the world-these are the positive corollaries of the Second Commandment.18 
As creature yet as imago Dei; again the human being occupies a dialectical eccentric 
position. We "are" a body in addition to "having" a body; we are identified with our 
empirical environment, yet we transcend it.39 Prior to the eschaton the human cannot yet 
be self-identical, as are the animals which have their being in a species. "What its species is 
for the animal, history, the open uncompletable history of the humanization, democratiza-
tion, and socialization of man ... is for man."40 To ignore this eccentric position, this bipo-
lar status of humanity, would be to risk apathy or else the totalitarian homogeneity of the 
"new man" in various modem ideologies. 
The human being is thus bipolar. But in a world of utilitarian values and interlocking 
technology, it is especially important to emphasize not just our finitude, but our prelimi-
nary freedom. This transcendent dimension of the human creature is promise and fore-
taste of our eschatological identity. In contrast to all ideological reductionisms, the human 
already has a share in the endless freedom of the Creator over against all finite objects 
and circumstances. This measure of participation in divine freedom is safeguarded by the 
Second Commandment and by the offense of the cross. So humanity combines earnest-
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ness and mirth, a painful longing for the consummation of creation blended with a playful 
celebration of God's good pleasure here and now. In this continuing dialectic, we humans 
suffer and yet prefigure with joy our eschatological destiny." 
II 
Since 1980 Moltmann has been publishing a new series of major theological works, sub-
titled "Systematic Contributions to Theology." This series marks the most discemable shift in 
his thinking. It consolidates the newer trends of his thinking, a "messianic theology," while 
bringing to maturity many of the older ones. In this later phrase theological anthropology is 
now seldom singled out for the sustained attention it once had-with some exceptions, such 
as sections of God in Creation (1985) and his essays on human rights. Indirectly, however, 
anthropology continues to be addressed. Indeed, the later Moltrnann has become a champi-
on of human experience as a genuine source of knowledge of God-albeit in a dialectical 
way, of course, that avoids the reductionist pitfalls of Protestant liberalism. 
Some of the changes in Moltmann' s more recent work are largely a matter of empha-
sis. Progressive Marxist categories and thinkers, for instance, have receded in his analyses. 
There is far less attention to the Unmensch or to an analysis of sin than he gave thirty 
years ago. Instead there is a celebration of human potential and bodily existence, some-
times in hyperbolic language. Does this mean that "hope," in the later Moltmann, has 
become tainted with secular humanism and the self-help movements of today's pop cul-
ture? Not really. While recognizing the risks, he nevertheless cautions pious critics against 
denouncing "self-actualization" as irreligious egotism. They should ask instead which "self 
is meant! If it refers to one's essence, then self-actualization is no secular egotism but is 
intrinsic to the biblical command, "Love your neighbor as yourself.''" Genuine love 
bestows self-actualization in both directions. Moltmann also demonstrates that his ground-
ing in biblical theology is unchanged, for he insists that the fullness of life conferred by 
God's Spirit is not done for moral or egotistical grounds, "for the sake of a personal fulfill-
ment,'' but is granted for the sake of God's righteousness." 
Several newer motifs are also discemable. The flowering of Moltmann' s trinitarian 
thought, certainly, has deeply affected his portrayal of men and women. Another influ-
ence has been his work with the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of 
Churches which, overshadowing his earlier dialogues with non-Christian partners, gives a 
more ecumenical, intra-Christian context for his "systematic contributions." Concern for 
eco-justice and harmony with the earth," rather than the early political theology, has 
come to shape his analyses of human selfhood. In general, however, there is no major 
shift in direction of Moltmann's vision of being human, and most of those motifs noted in 
his earlier anthropology continue. 
For instance, the familiar polarity of the human being as creature and as imago Dei now 
receives important elaboration in the Gifford Lectures of 1984-85. While modernity is 
fond of emphasizing how people "differ'' from the animals, Moltmann instead chooses to 
begin with how humans are bonded to other creatures: "the human being as 'a creature 
in the fellowship of creation'," as a microcosm of the creation, an imago mundi." In the 
temporal sequence of the Old Testament narrative, humans are God's last creation before 
the sabbath, and they stand before God as representatives of the macrocosm, interceding 
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on its behalf. But in the history of redemption the sequence is reversed: humans are creat-
ed first. after Christ. and it is the new heavens and earth that come at the end. the ulti-
mate sabbath. In their double role as creatures. then, humans are "priestly by nature, and 
stand before God on behalf of the earth and before the earth on behalf of God."" 
The other half of this initial polarity, humanity as imago Dei, however, Moltmann has 
revised in a successive, trinitarian fashion. He now explains that, while humans were origi-
nally designated as imago Dei: their messianic calling is to be imago Christi and their escha-
tological glorification will be gloria Dei." For the first of these three stages, the curious 
grammatical mixture of singular and plural in Genesis I :26f. ("Let us make human beings 
in our image ... ") suggests that God is no undifferentiated monad, but finds correspon-
dence in human community and its sexual differentiation. So we humans are preeminent-
ly social beings, not just individuals who later join together. The much-debated "likeness 
to God" of the first man and woman is not a fixed "characteristic" setting us apart from 
the animals (such as soul or upright posture), but is our entire existence in its relationship 
to God. In short, it is the complexity of our relationships, both horizontal and vertical, so 
to speak, that constitutes our humanness.48 
The Genesis story then continues (I :28f.l with the commonly misunderstood commis-
sion to I) rule over animals, and 2) "subdue the earth." The mandate, however, is not to 
be understood as a restatement of the imago, but as an addition which must presuppose 
that right relationship with God. Only once we become God's "image" are we authorized 
to "rule," and even then only as (vegetarianl) tenants, stewards of God's garden. 
But this is only the beginning. Moltmann remains true to his early mistrust of defini-
tions. Definitions, he says, belong only to the future (and he goes on to quote Gregory of 
Nyssa: "Concepts create idols. Only wonder understands"'°). Meanwhile our present like-
ness to God is undefinable, being both indicative and imperative, both gift and task. That 
is, we are still in the process of becoming human. "The true likeness to God is to be 
found, not at the beginning of God's history with mankind, but at its end; and as goal it is 
present in that beginning and during every moment of that history."'0 In the New 
Testament the phrase "likeness to God" is applied not to humans, but instead to Jesus, as 
God's true image, and we in tum are called to be imago Christi (Rom. 8:290. The com-
mand in Genesis to "rule," then. can only be fulfilled by "ruling with Christ,'" and not by 
technological or governmental coercions. "Under the conditions of history and in the cir-
cumstances of sin and death, the sovereignty of the crucified and risen Messiah Jesus is 
the only true dominium terrae. It is to 'the Lamb' that rule over the world belongs."" 
The final of the three stages will be our eschatological glorification as gloria Dei. In the 
Great Sabbath of the end-time humanity will see God face to face. Then truly we will 
conform (that is, be "like in form") to the triune splendor. Accepting the label "panenthe-
ism" for his vision, Moltmann says that somehow we will participate in and with God" s 
nature. The oneness of Jesus with the Father (john I 0:30) will be replicated in the one-
ness of the disciples in their fellowship with one another and with God (john 17:21 ). "It is 
a fellowship with God and, beyond that, a fellowship in God. But that presupposes that the 
triunity is open ... [for] the whole creation .... So the unity of the Trinity is not merely a 
theological term; at heart it is a soteriological one as well."" 
Meanwhile, however, in the present time we live as fallen creatures. Does that sinful 
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condition call into question our status (dialectical though it be) as God's image? Here 
Moltmann rejects traditional answers, the patristic distinction between the sinner's imago 
Dei and similitudo Dei that safeguards the former at the cost of the latter. Indeed, as we 
have seen, he renounces any categories of "substance." Instead, humans are constituted by 
their standing given by God's history. "The presence of God makes the human being 
undeprivably and inescapably God's image .... The dignity of human beings is unfor-
feitable, ... thanks to the abiding presence of God"" It is only our relationship to God, not 
the reverse, which sin can pervert. In this way (echoing Luther's famous phrase), the 
human being can be entirely a sinner and yet entirely God's image. 
Humanity's likeness to God, says Moltrnann, should be construed in social terms (par-
alleling Eastern Orthodoxy's doctrine of Trinity), rather than in psychological terms (the 
Western trinitarian tradition, since Augustine). This would avoid the time-honored pitfalls 
of defining the imago Dei as the intellectual, sexless soul which dominates the body in the 
same way that God is pictured as dominating the created world." For centuries the 
Western church has been all too fond of reducing key theological concepts to a "doctrine 
of sovereignty," emulating the dualism of some cosmic autocrat coercing his property into 
line. Visualizing such monarchial theism in the heavens, however, can only lead to social 
hierarchies, class oppression, and ecological plundering on earth. Such practical conse-
quences in society seem to have been one of Moltmann's initial motivations in turning to 
a careful construction of a more social doctrine of Trinity. Such a reformulation of God-
language must accordingly have an impact on our conceptualization of God's image in 
humanity. Moltmann is indebted to Eastern Orthodox theologians, who 
started from the essential fellowship of the Trinity (perichoresis) and found the 
imago Dei in the primal human community. We have taken up these ideas as a basis 
for a pronouncedly social doctrine of human likeness to God in a theology of the 
open Trinity. Instead of starting from a closed and self-contained Trinity which man-
ifests itself outwardly without differentiation, we have taken as our premise an open 
Trinity which manifests itself outwardly in differentiated form." 
Since the triune God is thrown open to us and all the world, seeking not domination 
but fellowship with the beloved creation, then it is in our very multiplicity of relationships, 
our communities, that we humans best manifest our likeness to God. Reflecting not just 
God's outward rule but God's inward nature, we are imago Trinitatis. After all, God creat-
ed us with bodies and as sexually differentiated persons who produce children. So 
the anthropological triangle determines the existence of every human being: every-
one is a man or a woman, and the child of his or her parents. The relation between 
man and wife signifies the inextinguishable sociality of human beings, while the rela-
tion between parents and children denotes the equally unalterable generativity of 
human beings. The first is the simultaneous community of the sexes in space; the 
second the community of the generations in time. If the whole human being is des-
ignated the image of God, then true human community-the community of the 
sexes and the community of the generations-has the same designation. 56 
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Readers will note that Moltmann' s former emphasis on a Christological redefinition of 
humanity has now been replaced by social trinitarianism, a perichoretic effulgence. Yet 
within this new development Moltmann retains a certain Christocentrisrn. In contrast to 
the Western tradition since Augustine, he states that humans are fashioned not by the 
entire Trinity but by just one of the personae. The Son alone became human and embod-
ied God's image on earth, and it is through the Son that we obtain access to the Father. 
'This is to say that lit isl through the Son the divine Trinity throws itself open for human 
beings."57 
There remain several sub-topics within theological anthropology to which Moltmann 
in more recent years has devoted particular attention, and we will now consider them. 
These sub-topics include human rights, human freedom, and the relationship of body and 
soul. 
Human rights, as a theme, has come to be one of the most practical extensions of 
Moltrnann's formulations of the divine likeness in humanity. Beginning in the early 1970s, 
this concern grew in part from his world travels, his participation in World Council of 
Churches' discussions of human rights, and his leadership in the World Alliance of 
Reformed Churches on that subject Indeed, the theme of human rights seems a meta-
morphosis of his earlier passion for political theology, which likewise was grounded in an 
anthropology of hope. In criticizing totalitarian political theory he states, 
ffihe Leviathan conception of the state presupposes a negative anthropology, in 
order to legitimate a positive theology of power, of authority and sovereignty .... 
By contrast, the covenantal conception of the state presupposes a positive anthro-
pology, in order to legitimate a critical theology of power and the control of power 
by democratic institutions.'8 
Because constitutional theoty holds the state is not just a consequence of human sin and 
alienation, but is rooted in human nature as such, therefore human rights must be safe-
guarded. That means a desacralization of political power, so that it may be held account-
able to the citizenry it represents. 
The foundation of human rights, however, is found neither in the state nor in some 
particular human attribute. The foundation is in human dignity. So all rights finally are 
rooted in Gods right, the divine claim over the creation that precedes any human claims. 
This right has emerged in the course of God's redemptive history with Israel and 
Christianity, awakening among us unfinished mortals the pain as well as the impassioned 
commitment necessary for human liberation. Therefore it is from this quite particular ori-
gin, the biblical traditions, that the more universal ground of human rights arose." "In the 
designation of the human being to be the image of God, the right of God to all human 
beings is expressed. The human rights to hfe, freedom, community, and self-determination 
mirror God's right to the human being because the human being is destined to be God's 
image in all conditions and relationships of life.""' 
It is in the future, then, that human rights are grounded, because in the future our 
God-given identity will be completed and our deadly inhumanity overcome. "Human 
rights mirror the claim of the coming God and of his future upon human beings."" These 
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rights derive from the full range of our multiple relationships as God's image, and so they 
include not only a right to rule over the earth but the right and duty to be in community 
with the non-human creation. And those rights do involve responsibilities as well; in over-
coming "an egoism of the generations" we must keep faith with nature and with future 
generations. Because various societies develop human rights in a one-sided, partisan direc-
tion (the West exalting individual political rights, for instance, and the East favoring collec-
tive economic rights), Christianity should defend the indivisibility, the intrinsic interrelated-
ness of all such rights. A "just balance of concerns" can be maintained, even while advanc-
ing the overall level of rights, and thereby "the unity of human rights should act as a 
pointer to the future of a universal established community of all people and nations."62 
Human freedom is another theme discussed worldwide, but to which Christian theolo-
gy should contribute. The secular concept of freedom had its primordial beginnings in 
power over nature and early humanity's first steps in transcending the realm of compul-
sion and necessity. Such negative notions developed, under Western liberalism, into politi-
cal definitions of freedom as sovereignty over "the other." Another secular view of free-
dom was striving for community, for actualizing the Good, which has become partly 
reflected in how socialist societies defined freedom. Christianity embraces both earlier 
modes of viewing freedom, but also presses beyond them in (unsurprisingly) a trinitarian 
comprehensiveness. That is, freedom must also include creative initiative, a messianic 
dream of the new, of unprecedented possibilities. "Freedom as the lordship of man over 
objects and subject is a function of property. Freedom as community between people is a 
social function. Freedom as a passion for the future is a creative function. We might sum 
it up by saying that the first means having, the second being, and the third becoming."" 
Moreover, these functions of freedom have evolved cumulatively, in a three-fold pat-
tern reflecting Joachim of Fiore' s medieval doctrine of the successive kingdom of God on 
earth, first as Father, then as Son, and finally as Holy Spirit The millennialism implied in 
Joachim's schema provides Moltrnann' s own trinitarian eschatology with a welcome his-
torical precedent. The resulting "strata in the concept of freedom"" point us toward the 
promise of the future. In the kingdom of the Father we are the Creator's property and 
servants, in the kingdom of the Son we are made children of the Father, and in the king-
dom of the Spirit we advance to become God's friends, addressing God boldly in prayer. 
These distinctions demonstrate that, like the concept of human rights, "freedom itself is 
indivisible and all-comprehensive. That is why every partial freedom presses forward to 
total freedom and to the freedom of the whole creation."" Again, capping this analysis, 
the culminating glory is anticipated. "When God is known face to face, the freedom of 
God's servants, his children and his friends finally finds its fulfillment in God himself. Then 
freedom means the unhindered participation in the eternal life of the triune God himself, 
and in his inexhaustible fullness and glory."66 
Moltmann' s later writings on being human are also more concerned with wholistic 
reformulations of body and soul. At one level, this tum seems prompted by social con-
cerns: his discussions with feminist theology'' and concern for our planet's ecology. Since 
humanity can neither retreat from modernity nor allow it to continue its present reckless 
course, we must try instead to "reinvent modernity." And this means, among other things, 
"a new non-androcentric and non-anthropocentric anthropology [which] will set free the bod-
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iliness and sensuousness of human existence ... ··GS But at a deeper, more theological level 
Moltmann's wholistic thought grows out of the flowering of his pneumatology, the vitality 
and integrity of the Spirit of Life which so infuses his recent work. 
We will note here especially the latest two volumes of his Systematic Contributions, 
dealing with the Spirit and (in a return to his original theme) eschatology. These volumes 
are notable for displaying the theme of bodiliness as well as his new methodological 
reliance on human experience. "By experience of the Spirit," he says, "I mean an aware-
ness of God in, with, and beneath the experience of life, which gives us assurance of 
God's fellowship, friendship, and love."" So bodily life and death are not just biological 
facts, but are to be analyzed as fundamental experiences.'° And no analysis of death and 
eschatology should detract from the present moment, but should ever enrich and deepen 
the living of life here and now. 
Increasingly, then, we find Moltmann's focus to be on human wholeness-a wholeness 
which is embraced by the Spirit of Life (his preferred phrase for the Holy Spirit>'' and the 
hope of the resurrection. Before God we stand in our comprehensiveness-in all the tem-
poral stages of our life, in our individuality as well as our sociality, in the living interplay of 
erotic love, in open friendship with people who are diverse, in the bonds of past and suc-
cessive generations, and in our relatedness to the natural world we also transcend.72 
Sexual differentiation, for example, is intrinsic to our divine likeness, for God created not 
just one individual but a triadic family: Adam, Eve, and Seth. 
lTJhe anthropological triangle determines the existence of every human bemg: every-
one is a man or a woman, and the child of his or her parents. The relation between 
man and wife signifies the inextinguishable sociality of human beings, while the rela-
tion between parents and children denotes the equally unalterable generativity of 
human beings. The first is the simultaneous community of the sexes in space; the 
second the community of the generations in time. If the whole human being is desig-
nated the image of God, then true human community-the community of the sexes 
and the community of the generations-has the same designation." 
It is these manifold dimensions which, as we have seen, attest our trinitarian likeness to 
God, a mutual perichoresis that awaits future completion. And most broadly, Moltmann's 
hope has come to be undergirded by "a panentheistic vision of the world in God, and 
God in the world."" 
The relationship of body and soul, therefore, must be redefined accorclingly. An unbib-
lical dualism has long separated the two. As we noted, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 
identified the imago Dei with the intellect, a sexless soul, ruling as "sovereign" over the 
body just as a monarchial God must govern a passive world. So the future life was pic-
tured as an immortality of the soul. Apart from bodily life, however, the soul begins 
implicitly to displace the function of God, acquiring the divine quality of impervious self-
unity. Plato, Descartes, Fichte, Barth-each in his own way contributed to a false spiritual-
ization that reduced the human body (and thereby women as well as the world of 
nature) to mere instrumental status.75 Another consequence of this dualism is the ancient 
(and now revived) doctrine of transmigration of souls. Ideas of reincarnation, to be sure, 
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have the advantage of promoting empathy with sequential generations, but they also sub-
vert any sense of personal identity amid a bewildering succession of life-forms. Moreover, 
the accompanying doctrine of Karma, with its iron chain of deeds-and-results, mandates a 
pitiless retribution that is quite incompatible with a principle of grace." 
The wholeness of body and soul, then, is important. And it is best defended by a doc-
trine of the Spirit as well as of Resurrection. Broadly defined, spirit means "the forms of 
organization and communication of all open systems of matter and life"n; as such, spirit is 
not at all antithetical to the body. Since persons are the high example of a living open sys-
tem, a person's spirit is "the anticipatory structure of his whole physical, mental, and spiri-
tual existence"" Furthermore, spirit is the communication between persons that enriches 
life, and is the loving affirmation that risks pain because of its passionate embrace of life." 
So there is no need for a distinguishable "soul" enduring timelessly, but rather there is the 
undying Spirit of life as an entirety, the undying relationship which God has with humani-
ty and humanity has with God.80 That vitality surges throughout the creation and infuses 
us with the love of life. And we experience God in quite sensual ways, such as the laying 
on of hands, embracing, the holy kiss, and the shared meal." So the body has its own dig-
nity; it is no preliminary encasement of human identity, but constitutes the temple of the 
Spirit (I Cor. 6:13ff.). Indeed "embodiment is the end of all God's works,"" the conver-
gence of spirit and flesh which will be transfigured in the cosmic redemption. 
But the body has its limits. What then of death7 ls it a natural part of the creation, or is 
it primordially unnatural, a punishment injected only after human sin?" Certainly 
Moltmann rejects the latter alternative. Reversing the claim that death is "the wages of sin" 
(Rom. 6:23), he sees sin instead as "the wages" that result from death-that is, the anxious 
arrogance, the violence prompted first by a consciousness that we are mortal. Death is 
not a punishment-either for Adam's sin or our own. Instead we die a "natural death." But 
neither does Moltmann accept the former alternative, death as a natural part of creation, 
for he defines "nature" as "no longer what is primal and not yet what is final""' It is that 
time of creation comparable to winter-temporarily real but awaiting the fruitful splendor 
of springtime. So death is "natural" only as an aspect of the present stage of the unfulftlled 
creation, and our deaths mark our solidarity with its groaning as the creation awaits glorifi-
cation (Rom. 8: I 9ffJ Once again, our creatureliness binds us humans to all forms of life 
on our planet, as we wait together in hope. 
Meanwhile, we live bodily lives, whether healthy or not. The concept of health should 
be redefined, says Moltmann, for the modem world coddles an impossible ideal: health as 
complete physical, social, and mental wellbeing. So defined, the ideal becomes an idol, a 
morbid preoccupation that isolates the sick from industrialized society, marginalizes the 
handicapped, and threatens to bring a crisis of basic confidence in life every time we fall 
ill. It is far better instead to define health as an attitude, quite independent of our fluctuat-
ing bodily conditions. "Health is not the absence of malfunctions. Health is the strength to 
live with them."85 It is "the strength to be human," throughout our living and our dying. 
Will death then ultimately be destroyed (I Cor. I 5:26; Rev. 20: 14; 19:20>? The later 
Moltrnann has become less fond of biblical apocalyptic language and so he hesitates at 
this point. Rather than resting content with a flat negation of the negative, he prefers now 
to underline "a new position of being" that has been opened up and prefigured by the 
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transfiguration of Jesus' crucified body. So it is better to say that death will then no longer 
be able to exist because with the resurrection of the dead, the creaturely world will 
receive imperishable life from the divine life. Then will begin our great metamorphosis, 
our enduring presence in God's presence."' 
This is Moltrnann's legacy in theological anthropology thus far. It is a vision of being 
human, as images of the Trinity who await their fulfillment, but who meanwhile exercise 
human rights and freedom in their bodily life. It is a constructive and timely legacy, which 
now will be best served by further discussion. 
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